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Granatstein: <em>Rich Relations</em> [Review]

BOOK REVIEWS
Rich Relations
David Reynolds, Ric11 Relations:
T11e American Occupation of
Britain, .1942-1945 (New York and
Toronto: Random House, 1995)
555 pages, $30.
his book has been much
praised and deservedly so. It
is wellwritten and well-researched.
and mirabile dictu, it includes
substantial material on the impact
of the half-million Canadians who,
along with some three million
Americans, served time in
Britain during the Second World
War.
Reynolds, a Cambridge
University historian married to an
American, has done extensive
research in the British, American,
and Canadian archives. and he has
read widely in the secondary
literature. The result is a detailed
examination of the way different
cultures dealt with each other.
clashed or integrated, and how the
respective bureaucracies tried to
cope. There is even some material
on how Canadians and Americans
got on- badly at first but better as
time went on, thanks, Reynolds
opines, to the fact that Canadians
carne to see that their British past
was being replaced by an American
future. He even cites Major-General
F.F. Worthington as suggesting that
since American equipment and
ideas were better than those of the
British. Canadians should try to
serve with the U.S. forces. No
wonder Fighting Frank had to be
got rid of in 1944!
The Americans, of course, had
special problems - black soldiers.
for example - that the Canadians
had and, according to
black Gls, the Canadian Army
handled matters much better. The
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Americans also wanted their full
pay, better food than hungry Brttish
civilians. and the right to try their
soldiers in their own courts; they
had sufficient clout to get their way
(including food that amounted to
three times the civilian ration). And
the Canadians? For the most part,
Canadians lived on the execrable
British rations, in Britain and in
action, part of their higher pay than
British soldiers received was
deferred or assigned back home,
and the Canadian authorities went
along with the application of British
justice to their military miscreants.
Reynolds notes dryly that two
An1erieans serving in the Canadian
Army robbed a Briton at gunpoint
and
were
sentenced
to
imprisonment and the lash; the
U.S. ambassador intervened
successfully to have the whipping
foregone. Too bad Ambassador
Winant or someone wasn't there
to assist Canadian soldiers on their
way to Dartmoor and I or the
Glasshouse. Essentially, the
conclusion from this study is that
Canada's military acted like that of
a colonial state; the Americans
demanded that they be treated as
equals and were.
In his one full chapter on the
Canadians. ''A Day Trip to Dieppe."
Reynolds makes the case
in
contradistinction to Desmond
Morton and others who have
suggested that the Canadians were
not champing at the bit to see action
-that morale in 1942 was such a
serious problem that the Canadian
commanders virtually had to get
their troops into action. And, he
points out, even after the August
1942 debacle, morale rose in
virtually all units. At last, the
Canadians had fought. the single
day at Dieppe helping to put an end
to the constant carping from the
British about how long the

Canadians were going to sit in
beautiful Salisbury doing nothing.
Sex naturally enters into the
story. and Reynolds is interesting
here. Forty percent of Canadians
who fell victim to venereal disease
had had intercourse in London:
only 30 per cent of Americans
became infected there. (I must
admit to being unsure what this
means.) Eventually, the Canadian
and American forces jointly
persuaded the reluctant British to
tackle the VD epidemic with a
program of tracing sexual contacts,
along the lines of !hose long
employed in North America. that
had some success. Gls. Reynolds
also says. complained that British
condoms were too small,
presumably more American
bragging: Canadians said nothingyet another effort by their generals
at getting along? And there were
more difficulties in the way of a G I
trying to marry a British civilian
than faced a Canadian. The result
was more Canadian war brides
than American, despite the much
larger numbers of Americans
stationed in Lhe U.K. Of course,
Canadians were there longer. and
briefly in 1940 and for some time
after 1942. many were billeted on
British civilians. That presumably
speeded the Canadians on their way
to ever-closer relations. Reynolds
also notes that the arrival of
Americans in quantity, from 1942
on. helped ease Anglo-Canadian
relations- the Canadians could join
the Brits in complaining about the
bloody Yanks!
Still. the author can make
mistakes. He refers to the Princess
Patricia's Regiment, for example.
and suggests that Militia regiments
made up half the 1st Canadian
Division in 1939 and militia
soldiers half the personnel strength
of the division. Not so. when the
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Permanent Force, not all of which
was in the lst Division, numbered
only 4.500. He says that
Montgomery commanded two
Canadian corps in 1941-2, again
incorrect, and he perhaps strains
a bit to suggest that Canadian and
British formations were all but
interchangeable. More seriously
than these minor slips, Reynolds
says nothing about the RCAF and
RCN who had their own tens of
thousands serving in Britain.
Still, this is a splendid book, a
model of comparative history that
is based on wide-ranging primary
source research. Charles Stacey
and Barbara Wilson wrote the book
on Canadians in Britain, but
Reynolds has demonstrated that by
bringing the Americans into
equation (in much the largest way,
of course). the worth of this kind
of history can be increased greatly.
J.L. Granatstein
York University
(J.L. Granatstein is co-author. with
Desmond Morton of Victor!) 1945.)

*****

TheU-Boat
Hunters
Marc Milner,The U-Boal Hunters:
771e Ro!:Jal Canadian Navy and the
QtJensive against Germany's
Submarines (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press. 1994) $35.00. 326
pages. (ISBN 0-8020-0588-8).

I

n this companion book to North
Atlantic Run. Marc Milner takes

an in depth look at the second half
of the U-Boat war. and the
involvement of the Royal Canadian
Navy in the Allied victory. Milner
biie!1y recaps the dismal state of the
RCN in early 1943. and then takes
the reader through the political,
administrative. tactical, and
technical advances made during
1944-1945. Although this latter
half of the Atlantic war has been
traditionally
shunned
by

historians, Milner's careful
research uncovers the incredible
advances made by both the Allies
and the Germans in the 'art' of
submarine warfare. From the
German Navy Acoustic Torpedo
(GNAT), to the Canadian AntiAcoustic Torpedo gear (CAT), and
the British FOXER, the reader is
introduced to the nuances of AntiSubmarine Warfare (ASWJ in the
Second World War.
This book remains, however,
an account of the Canadian
contribution to the victory at sea.
As with his earlier work. North
Atlantic Run, Milner is not
uncritical of the manner in which
it was conducted. With the success
of the convoy system finally
assured, "hunter-killer" groups
were formed to specifically destroy
submarines.
Zones
of
responsibility were established,
which saw the United States Navy
with its carrier-based groups.
taking a larger share of the
responsibility. In some cases, this
marginalized the Canadian effort.
There were many different
reasons for this occurrence, not the
least of which was the unavailability
of modem equipment for Canadian
use. Certainly the aspirations of
Admiral Percy Nelles and the
professional navy for its postwar
fleet. were partly to blame. Other
reasons have a basis in decisions
not to pursue the construction of
more advanced types of escorts,
such as the superb Castle-class
corvette. The abortive Canadian
designed RX/C radar was yet
another set back. A sensitive unit,
it worked very well, when it worked.
but its maintenance requirements
were such that it was impractical
for active duty.
With the arrival of long range
patrol (LRPJ aircraft such as the B24 Liberator. and the availability of
better 10 em radar sets, the nature
of the Atlantic war was drastically
changing by late 1944. Ships
equipped with type 144 I 45 sonar,
and the "Q" attachment, as well as
the more advanced type 14 7B
sonar, made identifying a
submarine in open water easier.

This resulted in the Escort Groups
achieving a much higher success
rate against U-Boats. However, the
problem of identifying a submerged
submarine in shallow inshore
waters. persisted throughout the
war. Situations such as the
"layering" of water due to differing
temperatures played havoc with
accurate identification. Therefore
spring and fall became the best
times for sub-hunting. The
technology of bathythermography
was developed in an attempt to
combat this situation, and was
marginally successful. Other
methods were developed to tackle
the threat of the U-Boat such as
hunts to exhaustion. These so
called "salmon operations" were
organized in an effort to kill elusive
U-Boats, but usually resulted in the
vast expenditure of explosives with
little to show.
Canadian support groups had.
by wars end, become quite adept
at sinking U-Boats; and what makes
this achievement remarkable was
the fact that it was accomplished
almost solely by the volunteer navy.
As Milner suggests, the professional
navy was concerned with postwar
careers, and the accumulation of
fleet destroyers, cruisers, and
aircraft carriers. But he never lets
the reader forget that the Canadian
Navy's primary responsibility was
the safe escort of convoys;
something which was accomplished
with great success, under the most
dire of circumstances.
In the end, The U-Boat Hunters
is presented as a well-researched
account of the late war activities of
the RCN. A "good read," it is
supported by maps. photographs,
comprehensive notes. and a listing
ofU-Boat kills by the RCN from May
1943 to May 1945. This volume is
a welcome addition to Milner's first
book North Atlantic Run, and
should be enjoyed by the Naval
fraternity and the general public
alike.
Rob Bromley
Wilfrid Laurier University
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